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“the criminal regimes were made not by criminals but by enthusiasts convinced they had 
discovered the only road to paradise. They defended that road so valiantly that they were forced 
to execute many people. Later it became clear that there was no paradise, that the enthusiasts 
were therefore murderers”1 
-Milan Kundera 
 
This current moment in global, political history is being shaped by the presence and 
success of right-wing populist politics. Notably, the growth and dominance of right-wing 
populism has shocked political systems and culture in the United States, where the conceptual 
thread of ‘the people’ has run through history since the founding of the nation. This far-right 
populist movement is perhaps the most divisive of any modern political campaign, and it has 
furthered the already profound polarization of the American public. The election of Donald 
Trump, and its aftermath, reveal the irony of his form of far-right populism. This is a movement 
which claims to represent the ‘American people’, yet its slim electoral victory sparked one of the 
strongest debates about elections and representation in modern American history. 
Populism is understood and applied as an incredibly generalized term and is mostly 
intended as a pejorative in political discourse.2 To be more transparent, being called a populist is 
tantamount to being accused of fascist thinking, of committing a serious moral misstep if not a 
more fundamental injustice. Yet, the only notions directly signified by the term populism are of 
 
1 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. Michael Henry Heim (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984), 176. 
2 Jennifer Rubin, “Bernie Sanders and the populist conceit,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2020. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/03/populist-conceit/ 
Mark Rice-Oxley and Ammar Kalia, “How to spot a populist,” The Guardian, December 3, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/03/what-is-populism-trump-farage-orban-bolsonaro 
Take, for example, just the headline of an opinion piece in the Washington Post: “Bernie Sanders and the Populist 
Conceit”, or in a news piece in the Guardian: “How to spot a populist”. The term ‘populism’ is a signal of difficult 
or dangerous politics, of political threat and/or upheaval. 
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popularity, of being of ‘the people’. In his book What is Populism? Jan Werner-Müller 
acknowledges the “complete conceptual chaos” we face as we approach the topic of populism.3 
So, to allege ‘populism’ as a statement of moral opposition, and only that, scarcely brings us 
closer to material political progress. If there is to be a politically viable opposition to populism, it 
must be robust in its claim of what populism does and why that matters, and it must move 
beyond a superficial moral condemnation. 
At this point, I am interested in observing the loud, apparent opposition to the far-right 
politics of the moment and identifying both the limits and insights of this popular critique of 
populism as dangerous and anti-democratic. This involves taking seriously claims that far-right 
American politics are populist, moving beyond the assumption that the allegation of ‘populism’ 
as a pejorative is simply a self-conscious response to success on the Right. It is fundamentally a 
project about democracy: as a cultural influence, a system of governance, a social reality, an 
ideal. I am writing it in response to the “need for nuanced political judgment to help us determine 
precisely where democracy ends and populist peril begins.”4 The language of democracy is 
central to populism, both in populist rhetoric itself and in critiques of populism. When populists 
or their critics use the language of popular sovereignty, national identity, belonging, and rights 
status, they are also exposing their deeply held convictions about the nature of political 
organization. 
 Any kind of otherwise legitimate commentary on far-right politics risks being marked 
hypocritical, if not overlooked altogether, if it does not consider its own relation to the kinds of 
ideological trappings that it recognizes and condemns in the movement under criticism. If we 
believe that it is what is ideological about populism that makes it dangerous, we must be aware 
 
3 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (London: Penguin Random House, 2017), 10. 
4 Müller, Populism, 6. 
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of our own ideological tendencies. There is a sense that, even with careful effort, we cannot 
avoid ideology in our thinking: philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek notes to this point 
that “the subject who maintains his distance towards the ritual [of ideology] is unaware of the 
fact that the ritual already dominates him from within.”5 In his writing on populism in particular, 
Žižek suggests that “the automatic dismissal of entertaining any thoughts outside the established 
postpolitical coordinates as ‘populist demagoguery’ is hitherto the purest proof that we 
effectively live under a new Denkverbot.”6 This comment addresses two separate conversations: 
one about ideology, and the other about populism. The German denkverbot translates roughly to 
“thought ban”, and reminds us of the pressing danger of ideological thinking: that it de-
incentivizes critical thought and misleadingly (though conveniently) superimposes onto the 
process of history a “consistency which exists nowhere in the realm of reality.”7 Žižek suggests 
that the critique of populism itself tends toward an ideological form; he may be correct in his 
observation that the term ‘populism’ is used too broadly, in a manner that overlooks particular 
circumstances and flattens out the nuances of political reality. However, this should not steer one 
away from using the term ‘populism’ as a conceptual tool of understanding as parts of society 
begin to confront and challenge politics on the far-right. Rather, it should incentivize the pursuit 
of bringing forth a thoughtful critique of far-right politics, especially those which may be best 
understood as populist. 
 To confront political reality, to play an appropriate role in the progress of history, we 
must give ourselves the benefit of full context by doing historically grounded political theory. 
This involves not only detailing ‘populist’ narratives or acts, but considering why it is useful, or 
 
5 Slavoj Žižek. The Plague of Fantasies. (London/New York: Verso, 1997), 6 
6 Slavoj Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 553. 
7 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1948), 471. 
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even essential, to think of a movement as populist at all. Each iteration of populism plays its own 
distinct role in political history. Part of understanding populist movements, then, is looking back 
in history to identify what conditions their politics emerged from. The way that we think about 
the processes and the movement of history is often crucial in how we process and then respond 
to political movements. In his famous critique of historicism, “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”, Walter Benjamin poses that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of 
emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”8 It is not out of turn to say that 
contemporary American politics is the ‘emergency situation’ in which we live. The election of 
President Donald J. Trump in 2016 signaled a decisive shift in the political landscape of the 
country. Even if Trump’s success has been many years of history in the making, his election 
itself was unprecedented and is recognized as such by those on both ends of the political 
spectrum. The Left (and the center, as represented by some standard news establishments) have 
declared this particular emergency to be a democratic emergency, concerning the integrity of our 
political systems and the rights of the people as citizens of a democracy. We cannot, then, 
dismiss right-wing populism as a chance phenomena having nothing to do with democratic 
politics. 
 In thinking about the particularities of contemporary politics as they relate to a broader 
historical moment, it is helpful to have a framework that grounds us in the process of history. In 
addition to the notion of the historical emergency, Benjamin puts forth in his Theses a metaphor 
explaining the role and function of progress in history.9 He refers to an image of “the Angel of 
 
8 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry 
Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 257. 
9 The metaphor of the “Angel of History” is Benjamin’s interpretation of an early-20th century monoprint by the 
Swiss-German artist Paul Klee. 
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History”, interpreting the movement and disposition of the Angel as insights to the historical 
process as a whole. The passage reads: 
[The Angel’s] face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he 
sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels 
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.10 
 
By this understanding, history is written by the victors of contention and conflict, and the 
narratives that are recognized as historical reality are in fact only partial recollections of the 
whole. Countless historical phenomena are left behind, unaddressed, as history moves blindly 
into the future, driven by the idealism and ideology of “that which we call progress.” The fervor 
of politics and ideology as “progress” suggests to us that the flow of time is linear, and that the 
left-over phenomena of history, the debris existing outside of dominant narratives, are truly of 
the past, and therefore are without bearing on the present moment. Benjamin’s historical-
materialist perspective points to the necessity of examining the material realities that are seen as 
existing outside of history. This mode of historical critique is, in some sense, a defense against 
ideology, against a conception of history that would lead us to act according to an idealism 
which is unrepresentative of reality. In the context of the current project, the process of 
examining left-over historical phenomena will require that we come up against the paradoxes 
inherent in democracy, both in practice and in theory. It will also require that we loosen the grip 
on our own attachments to democracy as a political ideal, as an indicator of “that which we call 
progress.”  
 
10 Benjamin, “Theses”, 257-258. 
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 If we think of politics as an attempt to organize society according to our understanding of 
the world, in line with how we think of human need, behavior, and aspirations, then it is also an 
embodiment of the concept of progress. There is a practical necessity for politics at the same 
time that there is a fundamental impossibility of developing structure without relying on 
uncertainties or on idealism. It is for this reason that it is crucial to look at dominant political 
movements with a critical eye towards their ideological tendencies and to identify specific 
notions of progress within the narratives that they put forth in the public sphere. This is 
important as we confront the “emergency situation” of the rise of populism in contemporary 
American politics. There is an extremely wide disconnect between the political Right and Left, 
yet both identify with the values of liberal democracy and with the institutions of the American 
constitutional republic.11 The rise of far-right populism within a state whose political culture and 
institutions are deeply connected to concepts of ‘the people’, of national identity and popular 
sovereignty, calls for a moment of reflection on the concepts and values of what we call 
‘American democracy’. What do we mean by it? And what do we want from it?
 
11  Having entered into this project primarily interested in the analysis of populism on the political Right, I have 
repeatedly come up against the issue of my own personal blind spot as it concerns such analysis of Leftist populism. 
In many ways, this is an issue of my own relationship to Leftist politics: regardless of my individual political 
persuasion, my intention in writing this project is not to define or discuss far-Right politics from a Leftist 
perspective, but rather to engage with the critical dialogue surrounding populism and far-Right politics while also 
keeping in mind the status of Leftist politics—in other words, what do today’s far-right movements mean for those 
on the Left? How might those on the Left respond to the same social and cultural forces that have been the impetus 
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In recent historical memory, liberal democracy in the United States has faced the 
challenge of limited political participation. The democratic institutions of representation and 
equal political participation that the nation was founded with are often taken for granted: voters 
are apathetic, and turnout in even the most crucial elections runs low.12 These patterns point us to 
broader questions that we must ask about our political system: what do we believe or expect 
Democracy, the State, or politics to do for us and our communities? The robustness of 
democratic practices and institutions mirrors our own understanding of the political system. If we 
sense that the promises of democracy are never realized, our dissatisfaction will be reflected in 
the health of the democracy, and its systems will cease to function. In other words, if we do not 
think that democracy works, we will not feel motivated to participate in the ways that make it 
work, and our lack of faith will transform democratic apathy into a self-fulfilling prophecy. This 
appears to be especially likely in a nation which was founded with a system of representative 
democracy and whose citizens do not fully recognize the value of their right to participate. Such 
a populace enjoys a lengthy historical distance from the dangers of an opposing system and lacks 
a cultural memory that urges it to take advantage of its freedom. But this conclusion is 
shortsighted—large sections of the population have struggled for equal rights within the 
democratic system, and still face structural barriers to participatory equality today. 
 
12 Drew Desilver, “U.S. trails most developed countries in voter turnout,” Pew Research Center, May 21, 2018. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/ 
Voter turnout in US elections is consistently lower than turnout in most developed countries. Even in the highly 
politicized and contentious 2016 election, only around 56 per cent of the voting-age population voted. These 
numbers raise questions about the accessibility of voting and the fairness of voting systems, but are also indicative 
of factors that are less easily measured, including attitudes toward voting and systems of democratic representation. 
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Another explanation for the decline of popular participation in politics is that some basic 
faith in the system of American politics and democracy, some unshakeable image of the nation’s 
fairness and freedom, suspends the population in the comfortable belief that things could never 
really get that bad, that the American political system will never sink to authoritarianism or 
fascism. This is, after all, the promise of our democracy as a constitutional republic: protection 
against abuses of power and against the suppression of basic liberties. Yet there is plenty of 
dormant discontent, uneasiness, and anger—on the Right and the Left—about the state of politics 
and society. Discontent about the state of things has come to the fore as a crisis of representation. 
The dominance (real or perceived) of the educated, increasingly liberal elite in America has left 
large parts of the population feeling as though they lack proper representation. The appearance 
and structure of American society has changed dramatically since the mid-twentieth century, and 
there is a vastly different conception of who ‘the people’ are, in the sense of which people tend 
to hold power and influence. This is why, as Müller puts it: “populism is seen as a threat but also 
as a potential corrective for a politics that has somehow become too distant from ‘the people’.”13 
In a representative democracy, a politics that is distant from the people is one of low citizen 
engagement and participation. Slavoj Žižek tells us that “when people awaken from their 
apolitical slumber, it is as a rule in the guise of a rightist populist revolt.”14 The populist moment 
in the United States, although not entirely unique, has a particularly complicated character. The 
reason being that this populism is operating within a democratic culture which has a particularly 
strong tradition of the very ideals and language that appear in populism more generally: popular 
sovereignty and the image of ‘the people’. It is a movement that has moved from an “apolitical 
slumber” to a radical claim of true identity and pure democratic politics. 
 
13 Müller, Populism, 8. 
14 Slavoj Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 552. 
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It is important to note that, for the purposes of my analysis, I will be focusing on the 
phenomenon of populism on the far Right, rather than on the far Left, as it would be ill-
considered to pretend that Leftist populism does not also warrant an in-depth analysis. Although 
there are precedents for populist success, measured by democratically-elected regimes, on both 
ends of the political spectrum—some of which are arguably stronger or more intuitive for Leftist 
populism—I will argue that the rise of right-wing populism in the United States reveals 
something fundamental about American cultural and political identity which has serious 
implications for the status of human rights and democratic freedoms. The contemporary 
incarnation of populism on the Right of American politics lends a clearer view of the evolution 
of the nation’s political culture and identity, and of the tensions which continue to draw the 
evolution forward.  
 Ultimately, the momentum of the right populist movement is centered as an 
antidemocratic response to the opening up and progressivization of American politics and 
society. I will argue that this populism appears in an ideological form that draws upon common 
wisdom and historical narratives in order to revive the foundational political myth of  ‘the 
people’ and of popular sovereignty in order to reconstruct an exclusive, narrow conception of 
‘people’ and political legitimacy. Far-right populism in American politics uses democratic 
language and appeal to achieve illiberal ends.15 It is an ideological rendering of the people within 
an exclusive imaginary of legitimate American identity. But before elaborating on this claim, I 
 
15 Popular will and national character are called upon as justifications for the militarization of borders, the 
detainment and exclusion of migrants, the integration of xenophobic and racist language into official government 
usage, and the narrowing of an otherwise expansive legitimate American identity. The Trump administration 
regularly attacks other key elements of liberal democratic society, including civil society and the free press, in the 
name of ‘the people’. 
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Chapter One: Ideology in Political Movements 
I. Ideology in Relevant Political Philosophy 
In the lexicon of modern politics, ‘ideology’ is a concept that dominates our 
understanding of political thinking. We often hear and think of individuals, politicians, parties, 
organizations as being driven by ideology; while such usage suggests ideology as cause or belief, 
its definition is still vague at best and is difficult to pin down. Perhaps our understanding of 
ideology is foreshortened by its predominant existence within the realm of politics, where it is 
scarcely considered to be anything other than a force of political will and power, or simply of 
political opinion. The process of politics is ultimately an expression of humanity’s will to 
organize life and society—political will begins with the perception of the world through a 
particular lens, a way of thinking. At its very simplest, this is ideology. But how and why does 
ideology function, and what does this functioning reveal about humanity’s tendencies in politics 
that can help us to better understand the political circumstances we find ourselves in? What are 
the implications of processes of political thinking on the outcomes of politics? 
Here, my understanding of ideology is as follows: ideology is a form of response to 
difficult questions or seemingly paradoxical realities. A political ideology responds to the 
challenges of governing and organizing human communities. These challenges are perhaps also 
the impossibilities of governance. Such challenges arise from the relationship between political 
ideals and material realities. There is always a dialectical tension between the language of ideals 
associated with a national politics or identity and the language of political movements which 
seek to gain power. This is especially true in a liberal democracy, where the principles of free 
expression and popular sovereignty mean that parties and movements can make diverse claims 
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and appeals which all have equal potential to be legitimized via receipt of public support. A 
political movement becomes ideological when it responds to political problems using a language 
of strict idealism. 
 My framing of ideology as a response to the challenges of particular political and 
historical circumstances draws heavily upon Theodor Adorno’s work in the section on “ticket 
thinking” in The Authoritarian Personality. Here, Adorno suggests that ideology helps us 
approach “the task of understanding the ununderstandable, [the] paradoxical in itself.”16 Ideology 
in politics appears as a response to the paradoxes of politics, the tension between ideals and 
implementation. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels add to my framing that ideology always begins 
in reality, though it does not reflect it. This assumption about ideology’s relationship to reality 
helps us understand how ideologies hold onto an image of legitimacy and truth even as they 
devolve into idealist fantasy. Louis Althusser’s outlining of the process of interpellation is also 
relevant here, as it points to the way that ideology engages with individual subjectivity and 
identity. This will eventually help to explain how political ideologies involve the individual in 
the image of a greater narrative, a broader movement of history. Finally, and importantly, my 
understanding of ideology rests on Hannah Arendt’s notion in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
that ideology discourages critical thought. 
It is appropriate to begin with the work of Marx and Engels in The German Ideology and 
of Althusser in On Ideology. These thinkers are historical materialists who are considering 
ideology as part of the functioning of production and capital within the broader context of class 
struggle and consciousness. The works are in conversation with one another. Althusser writes: 
“As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions 
 
16 Theodor Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (London/New York: Verso, 2019), 664. 
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of a production at the same time as it produced would not last a year. The ultimate condition of 
production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of production.”17 Ideology facilitates 
the reproduction of the conditions of production and allows for the perpetuation of social 
formations that depend on and aid the production process. “The reproduction of labour power 
requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also… a reproduction of submission to the 
ruling ideology.”18 This tells us that ideology, which is initially a metaphysical concept, shapes 
the relations of power in society. It also tells us that ideology demands submission, in the sense 
that total adherence to a way of thinking is unnatural. In this submission, we must forgo our 
intuitive forms of thinking and accept rigid ideological structure. Ideology is borne out of the 
material necessity for organizational structure and fixed, authoritative truth. It is completely 
inclusive in that it designates a fixed position for each group and individual in society, yet 
because of this same rigid structure can only serve a select few out of the diverse totality of a 
population. Ideology comes into being when relations within society are such that there are large 
populations of individuals who do not govern themselves, but who must be the subjects of 
ideological structure and function in order for the division and exercise of power to remain 
constant. Put simply, the ways of thinking and understanding embodied in ideologies come to 
affect and determine material realities and processes of history.  
In some ways ideology is a ‘practice’ which extends to include forms of disposition and 
behavior that embody corresponding ways of thinking about the world. This practice is so robust 
that ideology comes to be associated with the state and institutional structure more generally. 
Althusser famously calls these “Ideological State Apparatuses”, which are “a certain number of 
realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and 
 
17 Louis Althusser, On Ideology. (London/New York: Verso, 2008), 1. 
18 Althusser, On Ideology, 6. 
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specialized institutions.”19 Notably for the discussion of ideology in politics, Althusser includes 
political parties as institutions that act as ideological apparatuses. This can be taken to mean that 
ways of thinking in politics crucially shape political realities, regardless of the extent to which 
they truly reflect reality and relevant politicized topics. 
This is not to say, however, that ideology appears from nowhere—if that were the case, 
its semblance to reality would be so weak that it would be difficult to truly believe in, or even to 
passively accept. Ideology does not reflect, but rather begins in reality. Marx and Engels 
themselves emphasize this: “We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-
process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life 
process.”20 At first, this seems to seriously contradict the notion of ideology as “pure illusion.” A 
more careful reading, though, reveals that Marx and Engels simply mean to say that ideology, 
though never reflecting reality, is always beginning from it, is always referencing materiality. 
In Althusser’s writing, ideology brings us into conscious subjecthood: “all ideology hails or 
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects.”21 Ideology provides the individual a 
static role in society, a stable identity within a world that is fundamentally unstable and 
changing. Ideology calls forth from the individual “the recognition that they really do occupy the 
place it designates for them as theirs in the world, a fixed residence.”22 
Althusser’s conception of ideology is contained within the frames of Marxism: 
ultimately, ideological State apparatuses facilitate the reproduction of capitalist relations of 
exploitation. The analysis of ideology in contemporary politics requires a much wider view of 
ideology, but nonetheless rests on the insights of Marx, Engels, and Althusser. That is, ideology 
 
19 Althusser, On Ideology, 17. 
20 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 38. 
21 Althusser, On Ideology, 47. 
22 Althusser, On Ideology, 52. 
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is to be understood as a metaphysical phenomenon that structures our ways of thinking and, in 
turn, determines our material conditions. Ideology “is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, 
i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it.”23 The irony of ideology is that it is totally 
unreal at the same time that it is the most real, a parent of reality. 
Where this understanding of ideology—from Marx and Engles, and from Althusser—is 
unclear is in the dimension of individual adherence and behavior. While ideology may 
undeniably structure, even guide, the reproduction of certain conditions, it only does so to the 
extent that it engages with the individual psyche and all of the social and cultural components 
that it seeks to organize. Althusser’s formulation of the interpellation of the individual as a 
concrete subject via ideology reaches toward the idea that ideology engages with individual 
subjectivities—experiences which are highly specific and dependent on historical circumstances 
and conditions. In his book The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek emphasizes a similar critique 
of Althusser’s work on ideology, claiming that Althusser: 
never succeeded in thinking out the link between Ideological State Apparatuses and  
 ideological interpellation: how does the Ideological State Apparatus… ‘internalize’ itself; 
 how does it produce the effect of ideological belief in a Cause and the interconnecting  
 effect of subjectivation, of recognition of one’s ideological position? … Althusser speaks  
 only of the process of ideological interpellation through which the symbolic machine of  
 ideology is ‘internalized’ into the ideological experience of Meaning and Truth: but we  
 can learn from Pascal that this ‘internalization’, by structural necessity, never fully  
 succeeds, that there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and  
 senselessness sticking to it, and that this leftover, far from hindering the full submission 
 of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it24 
 
This formulation is best understood in conjunction with Žižek’s proposition that 
Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its  
 basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’  
 
23 Althusser, On Ideology, 33. 
24 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London/New York: Verso, 1989), 43. 
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 itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks  
 some insupportable, real, impossible kernel [antagonism].25 
 
Ideology functions only with the recognition from those interpellated subjects that it is not 
entirely unreal (a dream) but rather an interpretation of social reality (fantasy). What Adorno 
refers to as the ‘ununderstandable’, Žižek may call the ‘unfaceable’. The individual submits fully 
to the ideological command because he retains, through and despite this ideological domination, 
an element of his subjectivity that is strong enough to allow him to exercise his full belief in a 
Cause. 
 Other important theoretical insights on ideology come from Arendt in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism and from Adorno in The Authoritarian Personality. Unlike the historical 
materialists, who primarily consider the relationship between ideology and material conditions, 
both Arendt and Adorno are thinking about ideology in terms of political life.26 They are 
interested in understanding how individual thought and behavior, as part of a larger constellation 
of politics, are influenced by ideology. This approach is less abstract than the historical-material 
conception of ideology, and it is perhaps more useful in the analysis of contemporary political 
movements and trends, as it is more clearly applicable to case studies and examples from recent 
political history. 
In chapter thirteen of The Origins of Totalitarianism, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel 
Form of Government”, Arendt discusses ideology within the frame of totalitarian government 
and politics. To some extent, she follows the historical materialist point concerning the falseness, 
the illusory quality, of ideology. However, she is importantly more specific and articulate about 
how ideologies take form within political thought, and she focuses largely on the structure of 
 
25 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 45. 
26 This is not to say that the work of either Arendt or Adorno is not connected to historical materialism. 
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ideology. For Arendt, ideologies are “—isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can 
explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise.”27 This equates in 
practice to a flattening out of reality, a dismissal of the complexity of subjective experience in 
the interest of constructing a reality that is simple to grasp and to process. Still, it must be noted 
that this is an extremely broad definition, and that it does not imply that every “—ism” is a 
threatening specter of totalitarianism. It does not suggest that ideology is entirely neutral; it 
admits that “all ideologies contain totalitarian elements”, but qualifies that these are only fully 
developed by totalitarian movements.28 Thinking about ideology in the context of totalitarian 
politics can help us understand its tendencies, characteristics, and its essential statement about 
the relationship between the individual and the realm of politics. 
Politics not only draws forth some of the most urgent and consequential questions of this 
world, but also demands answers that will structure policy plans. Ideological thinking provides a 
shortcut past the difficult work of critical reflection in this process by allowing political actors to 
reach conclusions based on a highly specific and unusually definite interpretation of history and 
of present reality. This general structure of ideology, as well as the limited way it encourages the 
individual to engage with reality, is where Arendt sees the patterns of totalitarianism. To be 
submerged in the world of ideological thinking prepares the individual to live in—or under—a 
political society where critical thought about structural and policy decisions may reveal a basic 
incongruence between individual and regime morality. In the end, the fantasy-construction of 
ideology betrays those who believe in it. 
Human efforts to analyze and philosophize about the world are remarkably productive 
and meaningful, but are in the end always limited in their ability to provide answers or a sense of 
 
27 Arendt, Origins, 468. 
28 Arendt, Origins, 470. 
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absolute understanding. William Wordsworth famously wrote in the early 19th century: “The 
world is too much with us; late and soon.”29 Facing the limits of our own understanding is one of 
the defining challenges of modernity. The way that ideology shapes the thought process and puts 
forth a complete and structured understanding of the world allows us to ignore this challenge. 
Arendt thoughtfully observes that “ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being.”30 
Interest in the miracle of being leads inevitably to the reality of inconclusiveness. As a result, and 
in response to this problem, “ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical 
process—the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future—
because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas”31. That ideologies “pretend” to know so 
much implies that the mysteries of the historical process, whether past, present, or future, are 
perhaps not fit for precise explanation or understanding. A mode of thought which acknowledges 
uncertainty and plural subjectivity is difficult to follow in politics, where the task of organizing 
human life and society requires us to always have an answer. In politics, we must constantly 
make decisions and provide answers. Even if we are (to ourselves) unsure of our response, it 
comes from some basic belief in knowledge and truth. Ideology functions to affirm the decision-
maker’s right to political action: if the action is made on the basis of truth, then its consequences 
are justified and placed beyond the pale of criticism. 
Adorno explores this problem in The Authoritarian Personality, a sociological work 
written in collaboration with Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford. 
The famously lengthy book was written after the Holocaust, and attempted to deconstruct and 
understand the sociology behind fascism and antisemitism. A section titled “Ticket thinking and 
 
29 William Wordsworth, “The World Is Too Much With Us,” Poetry Foundation, accessed 26 April 2020. 
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45564/the-world-is-too-much-with-us 
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31 Arendt, Origins, 469. 
13 
 
personalization in politics” addresses the psychological function of ideological thinking. Adorno 
explains that “the individual has to cope with problems which he actually does not understand, 
and he has to develop certain techniques of orientation, however crude and fallacious they may 
be, which help him to find his way through the dark, as it were.”32 Individuals, depending on 
their political and historical surroundings, face different sets of “ununderstandable” problems. 
They turn to “techniques of orientation” which take the form of patterns of thinking and 
believing and which serve as a basis for political action or allegiance to parties and movements. 
While the “ununderstandable” problems that prompt the development of ideological thinking 
may well be different incarnations of the same basic problems or questions, they are nonetheless 
specific to their time and place in material history, and so are the frameworks of thinking that 
emerge in response. Again, ideologies “ascend from earth to heaven”, responding to reality, but 
not necessarily reflecting it.33 What may be “crude and fallacious” in an ideology should not be 
unthinkingly dismissed as illusion, but rather carefully examined as historically-specific 
phenomena. 
 
II. Is Populism an Ideology? 
It is only productive to discuss a form of politics as ideology if the understanding of the 
term is well-defined. In the absence of a clear theoretical consensus on what constitutes ideology, 
the concept should not be avoided or abandoned, but continually revisited. The concept of 
ideology should be recognized as a tool of understanding, rather than as an authority or as 
meaningless in itself. To this point, I have found the concept of ideology helpful in thinking 
about far-right populist politics, particularly in contemporary America. 
 
32 Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, 663-664. 
33 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 37. 
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 As we approach the question of populism as ideology, let us begin with the claim that 
populism, as a form of political thought, is neutral. This is not to say that populisms as political 
movements are neutral, but that the concept of populism in itself is. The neutrality is necessarily 
lost as each incarnation of populism enters the realm of politics and is shaped by the historical 
and material conditions of its day. Populism is an equally slippery and difficult concept as 
ideology, and the qualities of its structure and content will receive a complete exposition later in 
my writing. The following comment on populism’s neutrality comes again from Žižek: 
“populism is inherently neutral… [it] occurs when a series of particular ‘democratic demands 
(for better social security, health services, lower taxes, peace, and so on) is enchained in a series 
of equivalences, and this enchainment produces ‘people’ as the universal political subject.”34 
Here, populism is formally neutral, rather than inherently totalitarian or fascist. It loses this 
neutrality, however, when ‘people’ becomes exclusive and ceases to reflect real relations among 
society and between the people and the State. At this point, populism becomes ideological; this is 
exactly what has happened with the emergence and dominance of far right American populism, 
which weaponizes the language of democracy as it develops a limited notion of ‘people’ and 
intends illiberal, antidemocratic ends. 
 In his article “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective”, political 
scientist Paris Aslanidis posits that populism is not an ideology but rather a “discursive frame”. 
He argues against populism’s status as ideology by comparing it to other “fully developed —
ism[s]” which he believes to be truly ideological. Liberalism and socialism are two primary 
examples that Aslanidis gives of ‘full’ ideologies. From his perspective, an ideology “connotes a 
series of far-ranging policy implications and captures the hearts and minds of dedicated partisans 
 
34 Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” 553. 
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around the world.”35 Although Aslanidis intends in this article to be more specific about what 
counts as ideology—and to prove through this conceptual narrowing that populism is not 
ideological—his argumentation blows the concept of ideology wide open. If all political 
movements or philosophies that have broad policy implications and mobilize or inspire the 
public are considered to be ideology, then all efforts to organize human communities (including 
populist movements) are ideological. His is an irresponsible interpretation of ideology—in it, all 
politics is ideological, and the concept of ideology becomes a tautology that does not give us any 
insight into the structure of political thought. Aslanidis’ implication that all politics is ideological 
should not be dismissed completely; it is entirely possible that ideology is inescapable, and that 
especially in the modern world we must grasp onto frameworks for thinking that are, to varying 
degrees, removed from reality. However, in acknowledging this possibility, we must remain 
critical of the relationship between political forms and reality. In practice, and in the context of 
the discussion of populism, this means that we cannot discount ‘discursive frames’ like populism 
from being considered ideological. This is not to say that all populism is ideological, but rather 
that certain populist movements are best understood as ideology. 
Aslanidis puts forth a structural analysis of ideology which subjects the reader to 
superfluous mental gymnastics and ultimately misses the analytical point. The question of 
whether or not populism is an ideology concerns the relationship between political narrative and 
truth. It also urges us to identify what is ‘ununderstandable’ or ‘unfaceable’ about our social 
reality that exists behind the wall of ideology. Aslanidis misinterprets this struggle of truth and 
politics to be an issue of conceptual organization, classification, and measurement. Portraying 
ideology as a quantifiable category forecloses analysis of its most significant dimensions—its 
 




reflections on consciousness and belief, the nuanced and unpredictable interplay of lived 
experience and moral valuation. Eventually, Aslanidis concludes that the “conceptual genus of 
populism” is best understood not as ideology but as “anti-elite discourse in the name of the 
sovereign People [emphasis original].”36 The point is not that Aslanidis is incorrect, but rather 
that his conclusion is not inconsistent with the understanding of ideology as I have presented it 
thus far. In fact, it may strengthen the argument for populism as ideology: the discourse of 
populism is put into motion, gaining political power and significance, not on its own, but rather 
through its ideological tendencies. To use Althusser’s language, this discourse is what frames the 
ideological interpellation or hailing of the individual as a subject. The discourse of a political 
movement enables it to function ideologically and to construct “the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence.”37 
The tendency toward ideology is observable in the extent to which a way of thinking is 
divorced from reality and organized by an external concept or principle in its place. Arendt refers 
to this “emancipation of thought from experience” as she discusses ideological political 
movements.38 This also concerns the extent to which political ideals are recognized as only 
ideals, rather than absolute truths. Political philosophies like liberalism and socialism are much 
more adaptable and responsive to real developments than is an ideological form of populism. An 
ideological populism depends on highly specific historical circumstances, ie. the conception of a 
national people and its character, and is less likely than a more developed political philosophy to 
accept uncertainties. 
 
36 Aslanidis, “Is Populism an Ideology?,” 64. 
37 Althusser, On Ideology, 36. 
38 Arendt, Origins, 471. 
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Let us return to Adorno’s notion that ideology is what helps us to understand the 
‘ununderstandable’. If ideology is a response to a set of social and political challenges that are 
difficult to grasp, then ideological movements respond to specific patterns and occurrences, and 
far-right populism responds to an apparent series of important yet difficult questions about the 
nature of American politics and democracy (who are the people, what is the national character, 
who counts, etc.). Populism as an ideological response to democracy installs it as a shadow of 
democracy. Jan Werner-Müller makes a similar suggestion: “I believe that a proper grasp of 
populism also helps deepen our understanding of democracy. Populism is something like a 
permanent shadow of modern representative democracy, and a constant peril.”39 Approaching an 
analysis of today’s far-right populist movement in America in terms of ideology lends us an 
insight not only into populism as a form of politics, but also more trenchantly into the 
contradictory nature of American democratic systems and culture.  
 
39 Müller, Populism, 11. 
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Chapter Two: ‘The People’ of Democracy 
I. Populism as a Form of Democratic Politics 
The surge of populist politics in modern democratic history has revitalized the effort 
among political scientists and historians, among other thinkers, to come to a stronger consensus 
on what populism really is. There is a renewed interest in—and urgency to—what constitutes 
populism as a form of politics, what the emergence of populist movements reveals about society, 
and what it may mean for the future of politics and governance. Iterations of populism in 
contemporary politics have largely occurred on the far-right: notable figures including Donald 
Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. However, this by no 
means indicates an absence of populism on the far-left and otherwise. Broadly, populism—as a 
politics of ‘the people’—is a form of politics unique to the modern era of democratic sensibility. 
For better or for worse, populism is a democratic politics, in that it responds directly to the 
expressed ideals of the modern democratic state. 
In fact, the first populists were on the American left. In The Populist Persuasion, Michael 
Kazin explains the circumstances of the original Populists: in the late nineteenth century, the 
People’s Party emerged as left-wing grassroots movement of farmers who adopted the “populist 
persuasion” in the struggle against their political discontents.40 Populism was a phenomenon of 
left-wing rebel politics until the late 1940s, when “populism began a migration from left to 
Right… [and] the rhetoric once spoken primarily by reformers and radicals… was creatively 
altered by conservative groups and politicians.”41 Populism, then, can refer to vastly different 
forms of politics, to movements which advocate separate or even conflicting frameworks for 
political progress and change. 
 
40 Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 3. 
41 Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 4. 
19 
 
What these disparate populist movements have in common is their use of language: “the 
vocabulary of grassroots rebellion now [post-1940s] served to thwart and reverse cultural change 
rather than to promote it.”42 Populist movements rely on the imaginative capacity of their 
adherents to have a pre-existing notion of ‘people’ and of the relationship between individuals 
and systems of governance. Such conceptions of who ‘the people’ may be based on mythical 
cultural narratives as much as they are on lived or historical experience, and yet they take on the 
appearance of grounded reality. All populists, regardless of their position on the left-center-right 
political spectrum, make use of similar language and of similar conceptions of the structure of 
society. Such broad terms, however, end up signaling remarkably specific political positions as 
they interact with deeply held social convictions on national identity, rights, and power. The 
language of populism may be apolitical, even anti-political, in a way that populism in practice 
never is. 
 At the risk of stating what is obvious, the reason why populism cannot be removed from 
representative politics, and from political aims, is that it always exists alongside a claim to 
democratic legitimacy. This is to say that populism is coherent because of the democratic ideals 
that it claims as its own mission. Even more simply, populism would not make sense as a form of 
politics, or would not be viable, without the backdrop of democracy. Populism has, since its 
beginning, been a statement about democracy. Lawrence Goodwyn’s The Populist Moment is a 
history of the original Populist movement in America, which began when 
 Millions of people came to believe fervently that a wholesale overhauling of their  
 society was going to happen in their lifetimes. A democratic ‘new day’ was coming to  
 America. This whirlwind of effort, and the massive upsurge of democratic hopes that  
 accompanied it, has come to be known as the Populist Revolt. This book is about that  
 
42 Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 4. 
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 moment of historical time. It seeks to trace the planting, growth, and death of the mass  
 democratic movement known as Populism.43 
 
Here, populism has come to be associated with an “upsurge of democratic hopes” and is 
characterized unequivocally as a “mass democratic movement.” To speak and act in the name of 
‘the people’ assumes that the ideal of popular sovereignty is held as valuable. It is a move that 
reclaims the ideals of democracy and promises to restore to the people a culture of democratic 
rights and freedoms that has been adulterated through the process of politics and representation. 
 It is not only that populists can emerge out of systems with robust, institutionalized 
democratic practices, but out of any political system that uses the language of democracy in its 
politics. In the modern political world, what we might call ‘democratic sensibilities’ are 
generally assumed as a goal of political processes and outcomes, whether or not a state has truly 
adopted practices of democratic governance. Even repressive, authoritarian regimes in modern 
global politics adopt this subtext of democratic assumptions that may or may not apply to 
political realities. Democracy has become the zeitgeist of the modern political era, and concepts 
of or relating to ‘the people’ are now a common language within politics. As a ‘democratic 
sensibility’ becomes the norm for the rhetorical and linguistic appeals of political movements, it 
follows that there is a greater opportunity for a parallel rise of populism. Here, populism is 
indeed a “degraded form of democracy that promises to make good on democracy’s highest 
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II. The Dêmos of Modern Representative Democracy 
In order to understand what populists are doing when they co-opt the language of 
democracy, and to understand why populism emerges from systems of representative democracy, 
we must also identify what it is about ‘the people'’ that is inhered in the concept of democracy 
and in the ‘democratic sensibility’ of modern politics. I will begin with a focus on the etymology 
of the ancient Greek dêmokratia. While the form of direct democracy dêmokratia is different 
from modern representative democracies, its notions of ‘people’ and of the organization and 
exercise of power are nonetheless relevant in any discussion on the rhetoric of democratic 
politics. Considering the meaning of dêmos in dêmokratia can point us to the basic existential 
questions of representative democracy, and for this reason is useful in the analysis of populism. 
The English word ‘democracy’ is drawn from the ancient greek dêmokratia, where dêmos refers 
to ‘people’ and kratia roughly translates to ‘power’ or ‘rule’—democracy is literally “rule by the 
people”. English renderings of ancient Greek terminologies are, like many projects of translation 
notoriously skeletal, unable to communicate original language in its full depth. The rendering of 
dêmokratia as ‘democracy’, ‘rule by the people’, is no exception. Although its basic meaning is 
widely agreed upon, there are nuances to dêmokratia which have implications for the 
relationship between democratic culture and imaginaries of ‘people’. And although modern 
representative democracy does not claim to be the same as ancient Greek dêmokratia, it does 
nonetheless rest upon the same fundamental principle—the rule by the people. 
Daniela Cammack, after providing a brief overview of the various meanings of dêmos, 
suggests her own definition: 
“dêmos denoted all those who participated in politics through collective action, in explicit 
 contradistinction from those who had personal political significance. The former category 
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 comprised the great majority of citizens, but not the entire citizen body, since those who  
 performed leading roles were by definition not part of the dêmos”45 
 
Cammack’s definition makes a distinction between the collective people and the elite in a way 
that echoes the distinctions posed by populists. Taking Cammack’s understanding of dêmos, 
dêmokratia is close to ‘the rule of the common people’. It is also importantly rooted in the 
formation of group subjectivity as ‘people’ through participation in collective action. The theme 
of populist reasoning based on this conception of the people versus the elite is deeply ironic 
when taken in the context of representative democracy. The populist leader claims to be the 
representative of ‘the people’, the dêmos, who are marked by their collectivity. Collective action 
is the means by which the dêmos exercise self-rule, beyond the scope of elite power. The dêmos, 
characterized by their participation in politics through collective action, by definition cannot be 
represented through the action of a representative. Cammack writes that her definition of dêmos 
“is perhaps closest to that of Jacques Rancière, who identifies the dêmos as ‘the uncounted.’”46 
The dêmos, the common people, by this understanding are impossible to represent: that which is 
uncounted, which is so diverse that it is unrecorded, cannot be conceived in a simplified, 
representative form. In modern representative democracy, the principle of collective action has 
been transformed into the ideal of popular sovereignty. Thus, a representative who appeals to the 
ideal of popular sovereignty maintains the connection to a dêmos which is formed through its 
collectivity. 
The historical associations, and the accepted view, of dêmos suggest that it more 
specifically “implies ‘entire citizen body’ … dêmos, on this understanding, comprised rich and 
poor, leaders and followers, mass and elite alike.”47 Dêmokratia also “implied self-rule, and with 
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it the dissolution of the very distinction between ruler and ruled.”48 In modern democracies, 
popular sovereignty is exercised through systems of representation, rather than by direct self-
rule. Democracy as we know it does not really involve the ‘entire citizen body’, and the principle 
of self-rule is only peripherally accessible. Yet the concept of an undifferentiated, single citizen 
body, and the ideal of self-rule, persist in democratic politics. It is indeed the rhetorical basis of 
populist movements. Although populists recognize a distinction between the ‘people’ and an 
antagonistic ‘elite’, they imagine the dêmos as an undifferentiated body by identifying 
themselves as part of ‘the people’. While populists in power may be elite simply because of their 
status in systems of governance, they draw rhetorical power from the notion that they are part of 
‘the people’ just the same, and that true self-rule will be exercised through their power and their 
power alone. 
The concepts of people and power that are rooted in dêmokratia have also become 
integrated into the ‘democratic sensibilities’ of representative systems and of modern politics 
more generally. This persists despite the paradox inherent in the representation of a plural body. 
The representative aspect of modern democracy complicates the understanding of who ‘the 
people’ are, because in order to be represented they must first be defined. A ‘people’ which is the 
entire citizen body will necessarily be conceived in insufficient and potentially exclusive terms. 
The issues of representation, then, are always beneath the surface of democratic society. Populist 
reasoning is not only a claim to exclusive representation of ‘the people’, but also a statement on 
the identity of ‘the people’ as a coherent entity. Populists will “persist with their representative 
claim no matter what; because their claim is of a moral and symbolic—not an empirical—nature, 
it cannot be disproven.”49 The populist claim to representation relies on myths of culture and 
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49 Müller, Populism, 39. 
24 
 
society that are unshakeable in the psyche of many citizens. These myths strike a balance 
between an excessive vagueness that would make them forgettable or unconvincing and a 
specificity that is dangerously vulnerable to criticism over historical truthfulness. 
 
III. So, What Makes a Populist? 
 As we move towards an analysis of particular populist movements, we should begin to 
think more conclusively about the rhetorical forms that characterize populism in the modern era 
of representative democratic sensibility. In his 2017 book What is Populism?, political theorist 
Jan-Werner Müller responds to the rise of populism in contemporary politics by developing 
criteria and frameworks for thinking about populism (importantly, though, without foreclosing 
other theoretical possibilities). Though he does not pose a definition per se, Müller identifies and 
returns to two criteria of populism: 1) antielitism and 2) antipluralism. He argues that “it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to be critical of elites in order to count as a populist,”50 and 
that “in addition to being antielitist, populists are always antipluralist. Populists claim that they, 
and they alone, represent the people.”51 Müller’s suggestion that populists be identified by these 
criteria prompts a more complex understanding of what populism is. It gives us a framework for 
thinking of populist politics in relation to its origins in liberal democratic society, and encourages 
us to think about how populists form ideas about who ‘the people’ are. 
Conventional wisdom of populism recognizes the way that populists use a variation of 
the ‘Us versus Them’ narrative in an attempt to unify a ‘people’. Müller clarifies that populists 
identify themselves with the ‘people’, the ‘us’, who stand in opposition to the elite ‘them’. Here, 
the people are marked by their non-elite status, their identity formed around or as a result of their 
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average- or common-ness. Populists construct the elite as a threat to the character, identity, and 
power of a ‘common people’. Populist movements have a paradoxical relationship to the 
principles of representative politics. A fundamental assumption of populist politics is that 
representation is failing, that there is something essential about the people that is endangered 
when their political will is expressed by an elite representative who cannot relate to their mode of 
being. Populist leaders try to dissolve the distinction between themselves and ‘the people’ they 
represent in order to make their own politics the exception to the failure of representation. This is 
what Müller refers to as populism’s antipluralism—its claim to exclusive representation. 
The process by which populism emerges from a system of representative politics leaves 
room for different forms of populist politics, where ‘people’ signify different narratives of 
struggle. Žižek, responding to Ernesto Laclau’s work on hegemony and populism, explains 
Laclau’s assumption that “populism provides a neutral, ‘transcendental’ matrix of an open 
struggle whose content and stakes are themselves defined by the contingent struggle for 
hegemony.”52 In my previous chapter, I made mention of populism’s formal neutrality, and in 
this one I have already suggested that populism cannot be separated from the realm of politics 
because of its connection to democracy. Although these statements may seem contradictory, they 
are in reality not mutually exclusive. A type of politics that is formally neutral and also 
permanently political can also be described as a style of reasoning that emerges from pre-existing 
political tensions and which will necessarily adopt the tone of the politicized narratives 
employed to make sense of reality. Žižek writes that, for Laclau, “the fact that some particular 
struggle is elevated into the ‘universal equivalent’ of all struggles is not a predetermined fact but 
itself the result of the contingent political struggle for hegemony.”53 The elements of populism 
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are “purely formal, ‘transcendental’, not ontic.”54 Populism constructs a ‘people’, yes, but it is 
how it does so that really matters. 
If populism is accepted as a formally neutral style of political reasoning which produces 
‘people’ as the universal political subject, it takes on a dimension of political significance on a 
case-by-case basis. There are roughly three modes of populist thinking in the production of a 
universal political subjectivity: 1) a populism that functions loosely to address a non-exclusive, 
undefined ‘people’, 2) a populism that tries to define ‘people’ in real-time, dependent on 
contemporary political alliances and struggle, 3) a populism that operates based on a ‘people’ 
that is already marked by political history (by nationality, ethnicity, gender, class, etc.). The 
latter two of these possible modes of populist thought are the ones that emerge in representative 
politics. The former seems less applicable to our discussion of populism, as it describes populism 
outside of representative politics, if that were a possibility. 
In theory, a loosely-functioning populism can exist when ‘the people’ are not one thing, 
but are rather an open and unmarked group that nonetheless shares common interests and 
demands. As an example, a general reference to the ‘rights of all people’ fits the qualification of 
producing ‘people’ as the universal political subject. This form of populism is, however, only a 
hypothetical, because such an unmarked people does not exist in modern democratic society. The 
concept of representative government presupposes distinctions between groups of people in 
society. Further, the dominance of representative democratic sensibilities in the modern political 
world reinforces the notion that society is composed of distinct groups of people who require 
individualized representation before they are ever considered as a singular ‘people’ at a national 
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or otherwise centralized level. A non-exclusive form of populism is difficult, if not impossible, 
to imagine in an era of ‘democratic sensibility’. 
Populism as we know it, then, is exclusive, is political, and is indebted to representative 
democratic politics. Müller reflects on this conclusion: 
What follows from this understanding of populism as an exclusionary form of identity  
 politics is that populism tends to pose a danger to democracy. For democracy requires  
 pluralism and the recognition that we need to find fair terms of living together as free,  
 equal, but also irreducibly diverse citizens. The idea of the single, homogeneous,   
 authentic people is a fantasy.55 
 
Here, Müller references the narrative of populism as a threat to the integrity of democracy; this is 
a narrative that has become increasingly common in contemporary politics as far-right populism 
in particular continues its ascent to political power. His commentary also, perhaps unknowingly, 
points to a paradox of modern democracy that moves the conversation beyond the phenomena of 
populism. This paradox concerns the relation of this democracy to pluralism and diversity, on 
one hand, and to the fantasy of a single, homogeneous, authentic ‘people’ on the other. The 
problem is that the idea of democracy that persists in modern politics signals both at once. 
Müller is not wrong in stating that populism poses a danger to democracy, but he stops short of 
expressing the essential observation that ‘democracy’ potentially poses a danger to itself. 
Populism may be “a degraded form of democracy” that flies in the face of the image we have of 
a democratic society as fair and plural, but it is a form of democracy nonetheless, and any 
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IV. The Paradox of Democracy and the Populist Response 
 As much as ‘democracy’ refers to established institutional structures and political 
processes, it also names (and creates) certain modes of being and relational dynamics of 
collective life. Jacques Ranciére’s essay Hatred of Democracy addresses the movement of 
democracy’s definition and redefinition. It peripherally engages concepts of democratic 
representation, popular sovereignty, and political identity. It boldly claims that democracy is a 
fact—the reality of “the reign of the limitless desire of individuals in modern mass society.”57 
This understanding of democracy assumes the plurality of the citizen body as the complex, 
perhaps even chaotic, reality of life. It echoes Claude Lefort’s notable insight that “Democracy 
inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be 
said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose 
identity will remain forever latent.”58 Democratic politics always demands a ‘people’, despite the 
basic fact that ‘the people’ in a democracy is ungraspable, that  “there will never be, under the 
name of politics, a single principle of the community.”59 Democracy, therefore, requires a 
consistent and forward-looking attempt to understand the citizen body in all of its chaos and 
expansiveness—it is not the place for conservative politics. 
Citing the example of the drawing up of the US constitution, Ranciére argues that the 
institutions and mechanisms of the constitutional republic are in some way only ‘appearances’—
in other words, representations—which frustrate the public and incite a struggle “leading to ‘real’ 
democracy, where liberty and equality [are] no longer represented in the institutions of law and 
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State but embodied in the very forms of concrete life and sensible experience.”60 Democracy via 
constitutional republic reproduces itself by providing its people with both the opportunity and 
necessity that they represent themselves in public in order to be ‘seen’ by the representative. This 
is the notion of popular sovereignty: that the power in politics ultimately rests in the hands of the 
people to make themselves known, even in spite of their subordination to potentially faulty 
systems of representation. Democracy is in some sense a continuous reclaiming of the ideal of 
popular sovereignty by those who take political action, who eventually become the ‘people’. 
Thus, the struggle for sovereignty becomes part of the social expression and experience of the 
people. 
Ranciére explains this  well: “the power of the people, which is not the power of the 
population or of the majority, but the power of anyone at all, the equality of capabilities to 
occupy the positions of governors and of the governed.”61 Because the actual people are so 
plural, so realistically hard to define and collectivize, there is always the chance that an 
exclusive, self-identified ‘people’ (on the basis of race, nationality, gender, citizenship, etc. ) will 
make the claim to popular sovereignty. The sense that individuals gain from political alliance 
and collective political action mimics the ideal of popular sovereignty. A political movement of 
‘the people’ which has claimed its exercise of popular sovereignty is not just a ‘people’, then, but 
a ‘democratic people’ which can claim the success of democratic politics. 
 A far-right populism which imagines an exclusive ‘people’ drawn from foundational 
cultural mythologies is evidently a response to the plural reality of democracy and the 
paradoxical nature of representation and exercise of sovereignty. Ranciére scarcely makes 
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mention of populism in Hatred of Democracy, but in a brief fragment provides meaningful 
insight: 
Populism is the convenient name under which is dissimulated the exacerbated   
 contradiction between popular legitimacy and expert legitimacy, that is, the difficulty the  
 government of science has in adapting itself to manifestations of democracy and even to  
 the mixed form of the representative system. This name at once masks and reveals the  
 intense wish of the oligarch: to govern without people, in other words, without any  
 dividing of the people; to govern without politics.62 
 
The notion of governing without people and without politics is an example of the ideological 
simplification of complex realities, the providing of answers where they are not possible. 
Populists in power act on the “compulsion to get rid of the people and of politics.”63 
 At this point we can fairly address the reasons why an exclusive form of populism 
functions as ideology.64 
1) This populism is a response to the fact of democracy, the “paradoxical in itself” reality of 
‘the people’ as an unimaginably plural social collective, with a simplified and digestible 
image of who ‘the people’ really are. 
2) These images of ‘people’ begin in reality, but do not reflect it—they are based on 
moralized mythologies of ‘the people’ expressed in terms of familiar democratic ideals 
and are thereby placed beyond the pale of legitimate criticism. They draw forth a 
roughly-formed, nostalgic image of American character in their adherents, who recognize 
and therefore identify with the image. 
3) Once an individual identifies with the collective democratic struggle for self-definition 
and following that popular sovereignty, they are involved in the broader movement of 
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American democratic history. The involvement of the individual in any political 
movement is a rearticulation of democratic agonism. 
However, because an exclusive form of populism poses a simplified rather than properly 
reflective image of ‘the people’ in a democracy, it is especially vulnerable to criticism from 
virtually every sector of society that is vaguely ‘expert’ or ‘elite. Such an ‘expert’ or ‘elite’ 
responds to the world’s complexity through collective and diverse efforts to produce specialized 
knowledge. The first step of their project is to make understandings more, rather than less, 
complex; in other words, to assume, against ideological thinking, that the world is not simple. 
This example shows us, finally, that 
4) In its anti-elitism, the exclusive populism of the political far-right discourages critical 
thought.65 
 
V. Mythologies and the American Example 
 At the ideological core of far-right American populism is its exclusive notion of ‘the 
people’ which defies the fact of democracy. However, in the struggle against this style of 
populism as a form of anti-democratic politics, it is not enough to simply claim moral opposition 
to the principle of exclusivity or to ideological thinking. We must also deconstruct the narrative 
that links an exclusive people to ‘democracy’ and legitimizes their universalized political 
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subjectivity and subsequent domination in a system of democratic politics. Approaching ‘the 
people’ of the populist imaginary as myth reveals the extent of its separation from real 
democracy. In discussing populism’s ‘people’ as myth, I will use Roland Barthes’ semiological 
framework of myth and metalanguage. The final chapter of Barthes’ book Mythologies, titled 
“Myth Today”, is a semiological perspective on myth. It outlines the structures of meaning 
within myth and explains how these structures make it politically useful and persuasive. Barthes 
introduces myth as “a system of communication…  a mode of signification.”66 By this 
understanding, myth easily becomes a deceptive form of political speech which “is read as a 
factual system, whereas it is but a semiological system.”67 It is a system of values and political 
judgment that presents itself as a system of objectivity and truth.  
Semiology begins with the relation between two terms: the signifier and the signified. In 
a basic sense, the signifier (an image) expresses the signified (a concept). However, what 
emerges out of this relation is a third term, the sign, which is a form of the signifier that has been 
imbued with meaning through its relation to the signified. Recognizing the sign as the product of 
the signified-signifier relationship allows each term to remain separate despite its interaction 
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As expressed by Barthes, myth is “a second-order semiological system. That which is a sign 
(namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere 
signifier in the second.”69 Myth is in this way a metalanguage—it is a hollowed-out second 
language used to speak about the first. The sign of the first-order system, already filled with 
meaning, is the signifier of the second. This signifier is the form of myth: it is an image emptied 
of the history that made it meaningful. The form, or meaning, of myth “is already complete, it 
postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas, 
decisions.”70 All of that which lies behind the meaning of myth is never expressed; rather, it is 
the assumed (and silent) subtext. All of this history which “drains out of the form [the signifier]” 
of myth is then “wholly absorbed by the concept [the signified].”71 
Myth has origins in the historical past and purpose in the historical present. Barthes says 
that “mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by 
history: it cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature' of things.”72 Like broader ideology, myth 
begins in reality without reflecting it. A type of speech which does not evolve from the nature of 
things is necessarily a fantasy. And this fantasy is carefully drawn to align with political aims. 
Myth, a simple form with immense depth, is perfectly suited to become the foundation of 
ideological political movements like the far-right form of American populism, which relies on 
loose ties to historical meaning. Rightwing populists employ the myth of the American ‘people’ 
such that their rhetoric, on a surface level, actually appears as a championing of democracy and 
its principle of popular sovereignty. 
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The populist myth of the American ‘people’ is a second-order signifier drawn from the 
first-order sign of the ‘American people’ as a political and historical subject. The original 
signifier is the image of a ‘democratic people’, which appears not as a plural, unbounded citizen 
body but rather as a limited, exclusive group. This image signifies the concept of the triumph of 
popular sovereignty against the ongoing struggle of defining and representing a people. The 
image of the ‘American people’, the form of the populist myth, has never included democracy’s 
principles of liberty and equality as universal. And the shadow of American exceptionalism, the 
imagine of American democracy as a model for the status of rights and liberties in the modern 
world, discourages the critique of America’s fairness and inclusiveness. The use of the myth of 
the ‘American people’ allows populists to mask their unwillingness to engage with democracy as 
such. It facilitates their desire to govern without the people, without politics. When rightwing 
populists adopt the myth of the American people, they enter democratic politics without having 
to accept the reality of a complex, diverse citizen body. 
 Myth is also a means by which populists frame their image of the ‘American people’ as 
moral rather than political. Expressed by Barthes, “myth is depoliticized speech.”73 The 
construction of a ‘people’ within a system of representative democracy is a highly political act; it 
concerns the formation of the subject of politics. There is a vast history of exclusionary politics 
latent in the populist myth of the American ‘people’, and as a result the populist construction of 
an exclusive ‘people’ is nothing if not a political statement. This basic refusal of politics is a 
response to what is “paradoxical in itself” about modern democratic politics: the continuous 
confrontation with the task of representing an incoherent image, of organizing what is 
unclassifiable.74 Myth, like ideology, flattens out reality: 
 




In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of  
 human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with 
 any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without 
 contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the  
 evident, it establishes a blissful clarity.75 
 
The myth of an American ‘people’ that is racially, morally, and socially homogeneous is an 
historical interpretation of democratic politics that is made to seem natural and matter-of-fact. 
Populists on the far-right of democratic politics reject more inclusive notions of ‘the people’ 
because they reject the possibility of the redistribution of political power. A shift in the identity 
of ‘the people’ necessarily equals a shift in the expression of political will, and inevitably 
disrupts the status quo of power. Hence, democracy is not the ‘rule of people’, but properly the 
rule of anyone at all. This is a difficult reality to come to terms with, and it stands as a certain 
threat to any pre-marked ‘people’ who seek to gain and maintain political power. 
 The American ‘people’ of right-wing populism is not a group that has its ties at the level 
of occupation, class, or other common interest such as in a union-style alliance, but rather 
identifies with the notion of exclusion itself. To ‘Make America Great Again’ is to make 
America’s ‘people’ homogeneous again (as if they ever were). It is to reassert the ‘democratic’ 
power of the nationalist, conservative, and patriarchal minority. The claim of popular 
sovereignty becomes a justification for its exclusive monopoly over liberty and equality. The 
redemption of popular sovereignty, in this case, does not allow for the democratic flux of the 
social body; the populist configuration of democratic politics tries to erase plurality rather than 
manage it. The emergence of this form of politics is the consequence of the gradual 
disempowerment of a minority that has been overrepresented for most of American democratic 
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history. The fact of democracy is not only antithetical to the populist imaginary of ‘people’, but 
also stands as an entirely separate understanding of democratic politics and the organization of 
power and governance. 
 The rise of far-right populism in contemporary American politics is the consequence of 
an ongoing misinterpretation of the nature of democracy. The democratic ideals of liberty, 
equality, and popular sovereignty are not missing in the populist imaginary—in fact, they are 
voiced as ideals above all else, used to demonstrate the populist ‘commitment’ to democracy. 
The issue is that populists are not involved in a truly democratic politics. Populists imagine a 
democracy devoid of its fundamental and defining aspect: the politics of representing a plural 
and expansive citizen body such that governance is, in some capacity, a ‘rule of the people’. The 
erasure of the political struggles of democratic representation has created a false image of the 




“the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects [of 
ideology] recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right: Amen— 
‘So be it’.”76 
 
 Thinking of far-right American populism as ideology is characteristic of a broader, 
existential critique of contemporary political movements. Such a mode of critique focuses on the 
relationship between truth and politics, the tension between ideals as such and the forms they 
take in practice. This process requires us to make the seemingly counterintuitive move of looking 
backwards rather than forwards in history as we try to understand political phenomena. Non-
ideological politics involves the constant re-visiting of foundational ideals, and in some sense a 
constant willingness to re-interpret their meaning based on current realities. This is especially 
true in modern democracies, where plurality is a basic principle of politics. Its promise is that 
governance will reflect and respond to the will of ‘the people’, the whole social body, which is 
always in flux. 
As a form of politics, democracy always invites the rearticulation of society and its 
demands. Ranciére explains that “democracy is first this paradoxical condition of politics, the 
point where every legitimization is confronted with its ultimate lack of legitimacy, confronted 
with the egalitarian contingency that underpins the inegalitarian contingency itself.”77 
Democracy is, in some sense, a politics of uncertainty; while this may be an unsettling notion, it 
is also a fact that human life and communities are shaped and defined by their own uncertainty 
and precarity. The ideals of modern democracy—liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty—are 
not given realities, but are rather the underlying impetus for political action and progress. The 
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future of democratic politics must embrace the political struggle towards the realization of such 
foundational ideals. And it must also gain the capacity to discern between real and imagined 
democratic struggle—the ability to identify ideological distortions of what is happening within 
the citizen body. 
The far-right populist movement in America does not represent real political struggle. Its 
representative claim lends it an image of integrity and legitimacy in modern democratic politics, 
yet the represented ‘people’ are not an actual constituency. Rather, this ‘people’ is a mythical 
construct drawn from a history of exclusionary politics, a selective interpretation of democratic 
ideals, and a moralized understanding of political subjectivity. This populist movement relies on 
the ideological fabrication of scenarios of genuine democratic agonism in order to secure 
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